Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 3 | Issue 5

Article 2

1913

European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of
Criminal Justice
Edwin M. Borchard

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 3 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 684
(May 1912 to March 1913)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF STATE INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
EDWIN

M. BO CHARD,

Law Librarian of Congress.
In an age when social justice is the watchword of legislative reform,
it is strange that society, at least in this country, utterly disregards the
plight of the innocent victim of unjust conviction or detention in criminal cases. No attempt whatever seems to have been made in the United
States to indemnify these unfortunate victims of mistakes in the administration of the criminal law, although cases of shocking injustice
are of not infrequent occurrence. The case of Andrew Toth, who was
convicted of murder in Pennsly.vania, sentenced to life imprisonment,
and after having served twenty years was found to have been absolutely
innocent, is still fresh in the public mind. There was no provision of
law for relieving his terrible condition, the state legislature declined to
make compensation, and only through the generosity of Andrew Carnegie, who pensioned him at forty dollars a month, was the man able to
return to Hungary, his native land.' In England, the flagrant injustice
meted out to Adolf Beck, who through the most lax administration of
the criminal law was convicted for the crime of another man and was
imprisoned for seven years, resulted at least in the establishment of the
court of criminal appeal (7 Edw. VII, c. 23).though it left the unfortunate Beck without the 'slightest legal redress.Iza
Up to the present moment Anglo-American public law is wholly
opposed to granting an indemnity to such victims of the errors of criminal justice. The safeguarding of society by the prosecution of crimes
against it is, to be sure, an attribute inherent in all governments, one of
the jura majestatis. For mistakes in exercising this sovereign tight,
says our law, there can be no liability of the state. We go even further.
Whether the injury to the individual is accidental or intentional, on the
part of the state or on the part of the judge (except one of most inferior
jurisdiction), the injured person is left without redress.
'Virginia Law Register, v. 17, p. 405.

2aFor a full report of this remarkable case of mistaken identity see Parliamentary Papers, 1905, v. 62, Cd. 2315, Committee of Inquiry into the case of Mr.
Adolf Beck. Report from the Committee, London, 1904; Sims, George. The
martyrdom of Adolf Beck. London, Daily Mail Office, 1904; Lowell, Government of England, New York, 1908, v. 2, p. 463. Parliament to some extent subsequently vindicated English justice by granting Beck a gratuity of five thousand
pounds. The Epps case, reported in the Chicago Tribune of Sept. 23, 1912, and
the Hartzell case in Chicago, reported in the press October 25, 1912, are typical
of such injustice.
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Yet, within certain spheres of governmental action involving similarly a public interference with private rights, we admit freely that the
state owes compensation to those individuals upon whom special damage is inflicted. When property is taken from individuals for the public use, our fundamental law prescribes that just compensation must
be paid. Publicists as far back as Grotius, Puffendorf and Bynkershoek
recognize that compensation is a necessary incident to the exercise of the
right of eminent domain.2 On the other hand, when in the administration of the criminal law, an equally sovereign right, society takes from
the individual his personal liberty, a private right at least equally as
sacred as the right of property, it dismisses him from considerationregardless of the gross injustice inflicted upon an innocent man-without even an apology, much less compensation for the injury. Jurists,
who uphold the right of the state to prosecute and convict innocent persons without making compensation, have .been driven to draw fine distinctions between the taking of property and the taking of liberty for
the public use. 'We shall discuss these distinctions below.
The ultimate end and object of government is to protect those
rights which, as Blackstone denominates them, are the absolute rights of
all mankind-the right to personal security, to liberty and to property.
The- unquestioned manner with which in Anglo-American law the liberty of innocent persons is. sometimes taken is all the more startling in
view of the history of individual rights since Magna Charta.
The object of this article is to show the methods by which the legislatures of Europe have solved the problem of indemnifying those innocent individuals who, in the exercise of a sovereign right beneficial to
society and to the state in its function as the preserver of the public
peace, have been unjustly arrested, detained, or convicted and punished.
First of all, it may be well briefly to review the law in this country and
on the continent in order to show the wide difference in the civil remedies granted to persons who are erroneously arrested or convicted.
In the United States, we,, of course, recognize the right of an individual wrongfully prosecuted on private information or complaint to
sue the complaining witness for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution without probable cause. Likewise if his unfortunate predic.ment is due to the malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance of an officer
exercising ministerial powers, or even of certain judicial officers of inferior jurisdiction, the law gives redress to the injured person by an
2
Citations in article of Henry Wade Rogers, Compensation as an incident
of the Right of Eminent Domain, Southern Law Review, v. 5, N. S., 1879-80,
p. 5.
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action for damages against the officer.3 Where, however, the unjust de'tention Qr conviction results from the error, or even from the malice,
fraud or corruption of a judge of general jurisdiction or where it results
from an unfortunate concurrence of circumstances, the individual is
without a civil remedy."' The rule in this country may be expressed
as follows:
"No action lies in any case for misconduct or delinquency, however gross,
in the performance of judicial duties. * * * If corrupt he [the judge] may
be impeached or indicted, but the law will not tolerate an action to redress the
individual wrong which may be done."4
"As a general rule no person is liable civilly for what he may do as judge
while acting within the limits of his jurisdiction, nor is he liable for neglect or
refusal to act. The rule is especially true where the judge is one having general
jurisdiction, and in such case there is no liability even though he exceeds his
authority. The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that where a
judge has full jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, whether his
jurisdiction be a general or limited one, he is not civilly liable where he acts
erroneously, illegally, or irregularly. * * * Nor is he liable for a failure to
exercise due and ordinary care, or where he acts from malicious or corrupt
5
motives."

The reason for the rule is thus stated by Mechem:
"Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between
suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society, and
that rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to
be accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the
proper and thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for
which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to the
'public by doing justice between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may be called to account by the state in such form and
before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the duty neglected
is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not
admissible." 6

The general rule of the immunity from civil suit of a judge having
jurisdiction for injuries resulting to private individuals from his acts,
however malicious or corrupt, is therefore, well established in our law.
In the absence of statute any liability of the state is of course absolutely
excluded and up to the present time no such statutory liability has been
assumed either in England or in tle United States.
3
Throop,
3

Public Officers, New York, 1892, § 724.
aExcess of jurisdiction must be distinguished from entire absence of jurisdiction. For wrongful acts in cases where he has no jurisdiction at all the judge
is civilly liable. See Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, § 628, and § 629;
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., 335, 351; Hughes v. McCoy, 11 Colo. 591.
4
Throop, Public Officers, New York, 1892, § 713.
523 Cyc., pp. 568-9 and authorities there cited.
6
Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, Chicago, 1890, § 619, citing Cooley.
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In most of the European countries, on the other hand, the innocent individual unjustly arrested, prosecuted or convicted has the
civil remedies recognized by us-first, a right of action against the complaining witness or other person who has wrongfully accused him or
otherwise aided in his prosecution,7 and secondly, a right of action
against the officer through whose act he has been injured, where there
has been an excess or abuse of the officer's legal powers.
But at this point the similarity ceases. The extensive immunities
of a judge from private suit in this country are only recognized by the
civil law within the narrowest limits. On principle the continental
judge is liable for his tortious acts in excess or abuse of his authority like any other officer, the only qualification being that in matters
within his judicial discretion he is allowed considerable leeway. But
corrupt or malicious exercise of judicial powers in all cases involves the
personal liability of the judge.8 Besides the right of action against ministerial officer or .judge, however, the individual has certain remedies unknown to Anglo-American law. He has thirdly a right of action
against the state for the illegal acts of its officers, including its judges.
This is a subsidiary liability of the state fixed by statute which renders
7See, for example, art. 373 of the French penal code.
8
See, for example, Austria, Art. 9 of the Organic Law of Dec. 21, 1867, and
the Law of July 12, 1872, on the Judicial Power and the right of action for torts
by judicial officers in the exercise of their functions. Also, Spain, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, 1881, art. 903, et seq. Sec. 505 of the French Code of Civil
Procedure provides that judges are liable to civil suit in the following cases:
First, if there has been malice or deceit (dol), fraud (fraude), or extortion,
committed either in the proceedings or in the judgment; * * * Fourthly,
for a denial of justice. In France, the procedural difficulties of bringing an action against a public officer are somewhat greater than in Germany, although the
substantive' rights against a wrong doing officer are now practically the same in
both countries. Up to the last decade the French officer enjoyed greater immunity for his official acts than the German. The German Civil Code, §839, paragraph 1, provides: "If an officer wilfully or negligently commits a breach of official duty incumbent upon him as towards a third party, he shall compensate the
third party for any damage arising therefrom." Paragraph 2 provides that "if an
officer commits a breach of his official duty in giving judgment in an action, he
is not responsible for any damage arising therefrom, unless the breach of duty
is punished with a public penalty to be enforced by criminal proceedings." This
last clause applies to cases of wilful perversion of justice under § 336 of the
penal code and includes malicious or corrupt exercise of the judicial power. The
commentaries of Planck and Staudinger explain the narrow limitations of paragraph 2 just quoted. It applies first to a final judgment only and does not excuse gross negligence, malice or corruption. For all intermediate and interlocutory orders and decrees-as in negligently ordering an arrest or attachment, declining to receive evidence, failure to call a witness demanded by a defendant, a
disregard of undisputed testimony-the judge is civilly liable and is not protected
by the immunity granted in paragraph 2 of § 839. See Ndldeke, Die ci-vilrechtliche
Haftung des Richters nach dent B. G. B., in Gruchot's Beitrlge Zur Erlduternug
des deutchen Rechts, volume 42, 1898, p. 795, at pp. 808, 821-822; Delius, Haftpflicht der Beamten, Berlin, Guttentag, 1899, pp. 206, et seq.
687
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the state and the officer liable in solido for the injury to the individual.'
It will be noted that under this head state liability apart from judicial
and personal culpability, is not recognized. Fourthly, certain constitutions, such as those of several of the cantons of Switzerland, under the
head of personal liberty, allow a direct claim against the state for illegal
arrest. These cover cases of arrest in disregard of the forms of law or
of its substantial provisions. While habeas corpus, with the possibility
of action against some inferior officer, would probably be the remedy in
this country, a direct action against the state is permitted in these Swiss
cantons. The claim here does not arise from the admitted innocence of
the accused, but from the illegal infringement or interference with his
personal liberty. Fifthly, and lastly, we have in Europe the case of an
indemnity awarded by the state to those erroneously arrested, detained
and imprisoned individuals whose innocence is subsequently established.
Most of the countries of Europe, after years of struggle on the part
of reformers, have now by statute recognized the liability of the state for
injustice thus inflicted. The discussion of this subject will occupy the
remainder of this article.
1 °

HISTORY.

In Greece and Rome the procedural distinctions between civil and
criminal law were not clearly marked. Prosecution was by the individual
who suffered the consequences of the specific act. Nevertheless, it was
even then admitted that the private complainant, calumniator, was liable to the defendant in damages for a wrongful accusation or prosecution. The recognition of this liability of the complaining witness continues throughout the middle ages. In the Constitutio Criminglis Carolina of Charles V of 1532, it is provided, (article 12) that the complainant must furnish bail for the damages suffered by the. accused
should the complaint not be sustained. When the prosecution of crime'
became the function of the state alone and purely a matter of public
-law, the question of compensation to an unjustly accused or convicted
9Ziegler, E. Die direkte oder subsidiire Haftung des Staates und der
Gemeinden fuir Versehen und Vergehen ihrer Beamten und Angestellten, in
Zeitschrift fuir Schweizerisches Recht. n. F. v. 7, (1888), pp. 481-562. See also,
Stengel, Karl, v. Die Haftung des Staates ffir den durch seine Organe und
Beamten Dritten zugefiigten Schaden, in Hirth's Annalen des deutschen Reichs,
1901, 0pp. 481-508, 561-592.
I The history of the movement, both in legislation and in literature, for the
indemnification of unjustly arrested, detained and convicted persons, may be
found in Geyer, Die Entschfidigung freigesprochener Angeklagten. Nord und
Siid, v. 18, 1881, pp. 167-184; Pascaud, H. Erreurs judiciaires in Nouvelle
Revue, Jan. 1, 1891, v. 68, pp. 144-162, and in Revue critique de lgislation, 1888,
pp. 597-637; Riecker, W. Die Entschidigung unschuldig Verhafteter und Bestrafter, Tiibingen, 1911; Bernard, M. P. De ]a rgparation des erreurs judiciares,
Revue critique de ligislation, v. 37, 1870, pp. 360-415, 481-523.
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person, where the state was the complainant, was left out of consideration.
The movement for the indemnification by the state of erroneously
convicted persons was begun toward the end of the eighteenth century
in France, the land of "liberty; equality and fraternity," and of the
"social contract." One of its most earnest champions was Voltaire, the
friend of the oppressed. He bad taken a prominent part in securing the
acquittal and restoration of the rights of Calas, of the Sirven family, of
De La Barre and others." It was probably due to the intimate correspondence between Voltaire and Frederick the Great that we find in
Prussia in 1766 the first legislative expression of the obligation of the
state to indemnify unjustly arrested and detained persons. 12 This decree provided:
"If a person suspected of crime has been detained for trial, and where, for
lack of proof, he has been released from custody, and in the course of time his
complete innocence is established, he shall have not only complete costs restored
to him, but also a sum of money as just indemnity, according to all the circumstances of the case, payable from the funds of the trial court, so that the innocent person may be compensated for the injuries he has suffered."

This equitable provision was probably short-lived. At all events,
it is not found in the Prussian Code of Criminal Procedure of December 11, 1805.
In 1781 the Academy of Sciences and Fine Arts at Chalons-sur-.
Mlarne again agitated the question, prompted undoubtedly by the severe
cases of injustice by erroneous conviction which had then lately occurred
in France. The Academy awarded two prizes for the best essays on the
following question:
"When the civil society, having accused one of its members, by the agency
of its public authorities, fails in its accusation, what would be the most practicable and least expensive means to secure to the citizen, recognized as innocent,
the indemnity which is due him by natural law ?"

Prizes were awarded to the authors of two monographs, which have
since become classics in the literature of the subject.
The author of the first work, Le sang innocent vengg ou Discours
sur les riparationsdues aux accuzss innocents, is Jean Pierre Brissot de
Warville; the second, by the Intendent of Finances, Louis Philipon de
la Madelaiie is entitled Des inoyens d' indemniser l'innocence injuste"Heitz, Voltaire und die 'franz6sische Strafrechtspflege, Stuttgart, 1887,
p. 1 ff., p. 83 ff.
12Neue Verordnung um die Prozesse zu kfirzen, § 9, cited from Berolzheimer's Die Entschddigung unschuldig Verurteilter und Verhafteter, 1891, p. 7.
Berolzheimer obtained a copy of the decree of Jan. 15, 1766, from the Prussian
Staarsarchiv.
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ment accus6e et punie. 13 Their thesis briefly was that while it is an injury to the public interest if we hesitate to prosecute a suspected guilty
,person for fear of striking an innocent person, still, public prosecution
being a compulsory act, it would be wrong to punish the public prosecutor who has prosecuted an accused person subsequently declared innocent by the courts. The accused citizen, however, ought to receive compensation from the state. Brissot calls attention to the indifference of
society to the fate of the innocently accused person and advances the
argument that the withholding of an indemnity is inconsistent with the
social contract.
Since that time nany of the foremost publicists of Europe have
given serious study to the question and it may not.be out of place in the
course of this paper briefly to direct attention to their labors.
Between 1786 and 1792 the question under consideration was constantly agitated in the French Parliament and by French jurists.1 4 In
1788 Louis XVI presented to the States General an ordinance accompanied by a declaration that-he was surprised that nothing had been done
in France to indemnify persons erroneously convicted, and that the king
considered such indemnification as a debt of justice. In 1790 Pastoret
in his Th6ories des Lois P6nales devoted a chapter to this subject (v. 4,
p. 116 et seq.). He compared the misfortune of being innocently convicted to being struck by lightning and declared that the conviction of
innocent persons was "as unavoidable a misfortune in our social order
for the moral existence of the citizen, as hail or lightning is for his
physical existence." In the same year Duport in his draft of a code of
criminal procedure, which he submitted to the French Assembly, inserted an article which provided for indemnification by the state for
those declared innocent of an indicted crime, leaving its amount to be
determined by the jury. The French revolution put an end to the further consideration of this reform, with many other projected reforms,
and not until one hundred years later (1895) did France by legislation
undertake to solve the problem.
In 1783 the great Italian, Filangieri' 5 suggested the establishment
of an indemnity fund to compensate those unjustly arrested through
false complaints. In 1786 the suggestion was incorporated into the
13Both monographs are printed in the Biblioth~que philosophique du legislateur, du polhtique et du jurisconsulte, Berlin" 1782, v. 4, pp. 275-329; v. 6, pp.
169-243.
14 Pascaud, Op. Cit. Revue Critique, 1888, pp. 617-618. See also Berlet, De
la reparation des erreurs judiciaires. Paris, 1896. Also, Bernard, op. cit.
15Filangieri. La Scienza della Legislazione, 1783, Book III, chap. 22, Milano.
1855 ed., v. 1, pp. 610 et seq.
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renowned code of Leopold of Tuscany, later Leopold the Second, in
which it was provided (See. 46) that
"A fund shall be established out of the fines collected by the courts to indemnify those who have suffered from a crime, when the criminal can not make
reparation, 16 as well as those who without intention or negligence, but through
an unfortunate concurrence of circumstances, have-been arrested and subsequently acquitted, provided in both cases that the judge declare an indemnity
as due under the circumstances and fix the amount:"

The penal code of the Two Sicilies, chapter 6, article 5, contained a
similar provision.' 7 Since then many Italian criminologists and jurists
have supported the principle, among others, Carrara and Lucchini. 8
Lucchini, the draftsman of the proposed code of criminal procedure of
ltaly has incorporated in his draft a provision covering state indemnity
for unjustly convicted persons, but in spite of the vigorous campaign
waged in its behalf, the principle still awaits legislative recognition in
Italy.'
In England, Jeremy Bentham was the first champion of the doctrine of state indemnification for errors of criminal justice. -0 He considered the obligation of the state so obvious that any attempt to demonstrate it could only obscure it. On May 18, 1808 Samuel Romilly, - 1 an
apostle of criminal law reform in England, introduced a bill in Parlianent leaving it to the trial court to determine whether any and how
much indemnity is due to an innocent individual acquitted after an unjust conviction. Solicitor-General Plumer opposed the bill on the
ground that it created a distinction between those acquitted with and
without the approval of the judge, and declared this a task equally dangerous and unconstitutional. The bill was withdrawn and no attempt
has since been made in England to regulate the question, although Parliament has on several occasions granted lump sum indemnities as a
26It is interesting in this connection to examine Bentham's proposals in his
Trait6 de L6gislation civile et penale, Paris, 1802, v. IT,p. 370, et seq.
' 7 Geyer, Op. cit. Nord und Sfid, p. 174.
"sCarrara, Programa del corso di diritto criminali, § 858, 5th ed., 1877.
Lucchini, L. II carcere preventivo, 1872, 2nd ed., Venezia, 1873, Appendix, p.
258, et seq; also in his Elementi di procedura penale, 2nd ed., Firenze, 1899, p.

403.

' 0 Rocco, arturo La riparazione alle vittimi degli errori giudiziare, in Rivista
penale, v. 56, 1902, pp. 249,274; 395-435.
20 Bentham, Jeremy. Op. Cit. v. II, p. 378. See also Nicolas, R. Des reparations aux victimes d'errours judiciaires. Revue critique de 16gislation, 1888,
N. S.17, pp. 348-356.
-1Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly. 3rd ed., Londcn, J. Murray,
1841, v. 2, pp. 84-86.
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matter of grace to various innocent individuals released after having
22
suffered imprisonment upon erroneous conviction.
In Spain, the principle, expressed in an unusually liberal form, had
a brief existence of fifteen months in the ill-fated penal code of 1822.23
While the question of indemnity was again agitated vigorously in
France during the middle of the nineteenth century, finding among its
supporters some of the leading jurists of the time, -4 yet the principle
was first accepted in modern legislation in the cantons of Switzerland,
where so many modern political reforms have received their first legis2

lative expresgion.. 5

The provisions of the codes of these various cantons are by no
means uniform, some recognizing the right of indemnit only for imprisonment by reason of a conviction subsequently reversed on appeal,
others for arrest and detention preliminary to acquittal only, (ULtersuchiungshaft, d6tention preventive), and still othe's for both.

To some

extent we shall discuss the provisions of these codes in connection with
the laws of the other countries of Europe (infra).
Brief code provisions authorizing the award of an equitable compensation to an erroneously convicted person are found in the codes of
criminal procedure of Baden, Mlarch 18, 1861, (art. 184) and of Wirttemberg, April 17, 1868 (art. 484), and in the penal codes of Mlexico,2 6
Dec. 7, 1871 (art. 344) and of Portugal 2 1 June 14, 1884 (art. 126, sec.
6 and 7).

It is only, however, within the last twenty-five years that the countries of Europe have shown by their legislation, a determined and fully
--The Law Times, Feb. 3, 1912, pp. 325-326; the Law Journal, London, Oct.
19, 1912, p. 623.
-Spain, Penal Code of 1822, arts. 179-181, Appendix, p. 705.
- 4Merlin, Repertoire, Bruxelles, 1826. V. Denonciateur and Reparation
civile. Legraverend. Traitg de legislation crininelle, Paris, 1830, introduction,
p. XXV. Dupin, Observations sur phsieurs points importants de legislation
crimivzelle, Paris, 1821. Faustin-H6lie. Thgorie die Code pinal, Paris, 1843, t.
I, p. 234. Bonneville de Marsangy. De l'ainliorationde la loi crinminelle, Paris,
Cotillon, 1864, v. 2, ch. 18.
-Tobler, Hans. Die Entschadigungspflicht des Staates gegenfiber schuldlos
Verfolgten, Angeklagten und Verurteilten, mit Berilcksichtigung des schweizerischen Rechts. Zurich, 1905. The most specific provisions on the subject are
found in the codes of criminal procedure of Vaud, articles 254, 267 and 539;
Berne, articles 235, 243, 343, 367; Tessin, articles 52, 135; Aargau, articles 278,
364; Balle-Ville (Baselstadt), articles 63, 101, 107 and the law of Dec. 9, 1889,
Appendix, p. 707; Fribourg, articles 220, 230, 350, 378, 388, 380; Neuchitel,
article 245, 249, 303, 347, 431, 508. The constitution of Geneva of 1794 had provided for the award of an indemnity based on the number of days detention.
The principle, extended, is preserved in the code of criminal procedure of Jan.
1, 1885.
26 Mexico, Appendix, p. 708.
27 Portugal, Appendix, p. 708.
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considered intention to fulfil the obligation of society toward the innocent victims of the errors of criminal justice. The Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, in the order named, enacted, in
1886, 1887 and 1888 respectively, extensive and elaborate laws on the
subject. In considerable detail they worked out the conditions under
which the right to indemnity shall be exercised, its various limitations,
and the procedure for giving it effect as a remedy to the injured individual.2 8 Indemnity is accorded both to erroneously convicted persons
and to those erroneously arrested and detained. Of the three the law of
Sweden is the most conservative, the law of Denmark the most liberalin fact, the most liberal of all the countries of Europe. In 1892, Austria (Act of March 16, 1892)-29 enacted a law providing for compensation
only to convicted persons acquitted on appeal and rehearing. The
draft of a new law extending the indemnity to cases of detention pending trial has been under debate since 1905. A similar restriction of the
class indeiinified-erroneously convicted persons only-is found in the
French law of June 8, 1895.30 iungary,31 the following year, in §§576589 of its code of criminal procedure of December 4, 1896, provided
compensation under certain conditions for both erroneously convicted
and erroneously arrested and detained persons.
The leading country of continental Europe, Germany, waited until
almost all the other important countries had by statute dealt with the
matter before itself enacting legislation on the subject. It was not until
1898, in the law of May 20, 32 that Germany enacted a law which, under
very stringent limitations, awarded an indemnity to persons erroneously
convicted, who on the rehearing of their case and reversal of the judgment
-8Sweden, Norway and Denmark, Appendix, pp. 709, 710, 711.
2 Austria, Appendix, p. 712. One of the best discussions of the Austrian
law, including the legislative debates and "motives" is found in Hcegel, Das
gesetz betreffend die Entschidigung ffir ungerechtfertigte erfolgte Verurteilung. Wien, 1901. See also Klewitz, A., iri Archiv ffir 6ffentliches Recht, v. 7,
pp. 311-329; Lbffler, A. Die Entschidigung unschuldig Verhafteter, Wien, 1906;
Krzymuski,
Ed., in Revue Penitentiaire, v. 18, 1894, pp. 805-815.
3 0France, Appendix, p. 713. A useful study of the law of June 8, 1895, with
the legislative history of the question, is found in Berlet, A. De la riparation
des erreurs judiciaires. Paris, 1896. See also, Pascaud, Bernard and Nicolas,

op. cit.

-lHungary, Appendix, p. 714. Doleshall's article in Gerichtssaal, v. 53,
1895-97, pp. 253-285, is -by all means the best article on the Hungarian statute.
2

3 German3, Appendix, pp. 716, 717. There is a prolific literature in Germany.
The debates of publicists are found in the Verhandlung des deutschen Juristentags (German Bar Association) 11, 12, 13, 16 and 22 session. The legislative
history is best brought out in Berichte der XI Kommission des Reichstages vom
20 April, 1895. IV Session 1895-97. Drucksachen 294, and Entwurf nebst Begriindung (Motives), Same Session, 9 Leg. Per. v. I, No. 73. The best commentaries on the Acts are those of Burlage, Berlin, 1905; Krause, Hannover,
1906; and Kghler, Halle, 1904.
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were declared innocent. Six years later (Act of July 14, 1904) Germany extended the principle of indemnification to those under detention
pending trial (Untersuchungshaft). Italy and Holland are debating
the question and will probably soon join their neighbors in similar legislation.
TE THEORY.
It may seem strange that this principle of compensation, involving
such an obvious act of justice on the part of the state, which had, moreover, received the general recognition and support of jurists, publicists
and legislators should have had to wait so many decades before acceptance in the actual legislation of modern states. The reason for the delay was in part the unwillingness to open already cramped treasuries to
unlimited inroads and the inability of lower and upper houses of legislatures to agree upon the proper limitations of the right, while not by
any means the least obstacle was the bitter disagreement between jurists
as to whether the indemnity was to be 'Considered an act of grace and
equity on the part of the state, or a legal duty and obligation. Before
enacting legislation, the European legislator demands the support of
sound legal as well as economic theory. For years lawyers debated this
question back and forth. The statement in, Merkel's Juristische Enzyklopiidie, (1st ed., 1885, § 63), explains much:
"That such an indemnity would represent the real feelings of justice of the
German people of the present time there can be no doubt. The reason why we
at"the same time hesitate to give this feeling legislative expression is partly (although by no means only) because we can not base it on a dogmatic legal
ground."

Arguing from legal principle a large group of jurists, whose authority carried weight among legislatures and the people, advanced three
arguments which seriously hampered the enactment of legislation on
the'stibject.
The first argument is that the state in administering justice acts
in its sovereign capacity and can hot be held accountable in law for the
burdens which particular individuals may have to suffer, when its sovereign right has been legally exercised. To err is not illegal. If an innocent individual is by mistake convicted, this is a burden which as a citizen of the state he must bear. This is the "act of state" theory, and a
frank avowal of the "assumption of risk" doctrine. If, said these jurists,
there has been an intentional wrong or illegality anywhere in the case,
either on the part of the complaining witness, ministerial officer, court
official or judge, the law gives the injured individual ample redress.8s
U3Anschiitz, Gerhard. Der Ersatzanspruch aus Vermbgensbeschidigungen
durch rechtm~ssige Handlhabung der Staatsgewalt, in Verwaltungsarchiv. v. 5,
(1895-97), p. 1 ff.
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To this the answer has been made that, while the individual in
modern public law must bear the burdens of citizenship without compensation, this applies only to the general burdens borne by all the citizens as a whole, and not to special sacrifices asked from the individual in
the interests of the entire community." When we ask a citizen to become
a juryman or a witness, 34a when his diseased animal is killed for fear of
contagion, 3 when his house is destroyed to prevent the spread of conflagration, when his property is taken by eminent domain for public use,
compensation is made for the special sacrifices he makes for the general
benefit of society.
An ingenious replication is made to the contention that the taking
of property and the taking of liberty for public use are analogous. By
the taking of property, say the proponents of the "act of state" theory,
the community is enriched, for which reason compensation is paid on
the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. In the case of unjust conviction the state receives no equivalent. The deprivation of the liberty
of the individual is no gain to the state.
If the compensation in eminent domain represented the public gain,
this specious argument might carry weight. But it does not. The advantage to society generally exceeds by far the monetary value of the
property to the individual from whom it is taken. The price paid represents not the gain of the state, but the loss of the individual. It is a
special sacrifice that is asked of the individual, for which society compensates him.
Two other arguments against which the champions of the obligation of state indemnity had to contend were drawn from the civil law.
The first was Qui jure suo utitzr, nenzinem laedit; in other words, the
state acting legally can legally injure no one. But in private law, from
which this analogy is drawn, there has been a gradual change from this
view of the legality of an act. The principle that he who legally uses
his own incurs no legal liability has been restricted in application to
the narrowest limits. Even a slight invasion of the rights of third persons (under an otherwise prima facie lawful use of one's own) has, given
rise to the application of the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas. The transition in point of view took place definitely in England
34

Mayer, Otto. Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht, Leipzig, 1896, v. 2, pp. 345 if;
Bluntschli, Allgemeines Staatsrecht, Book X, ch. 5, Mfinchen, 1868 ed., p. 409 if.
34
faThese illustrations show that at least in some of its applications the
principle of compensation by the state for a deprivation of liberty is not unknown.
3
5L6ffler. Die Entschidigung unschuldig Verhafteter. Wien, 1906, p. 8.
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in 1862, in the case of Bamford v. Turnley.3
The general rule of both
public and private law now is that a private act is considered lawful and
is permitted by the state, there being admittedly no negligence or fault,
only to the extent that it does not infringe the legal rights of others."
The other objection drawn from the civil law was: "without fault
no liability," and for many years it proved one of the most serious. This
principle of "no liability without fault" has been incorporated into the
civil or private law of all civilized countries, and although American
statutory and non-statutory law reveals many cases of liability without
fault, the principle has been one of the great obstacles which the workmen's compensation laws have had to overcome. 38 Modern social and
economic conditions, however, have brought about an important modification in the rigidity of the doctrine, so that for large classes of cases
liability is predicated on the mere causal relation between the act and
the injutry, whether inflicted with or without fault. The workmen's
compensation acts are perhaps the clearest illustration of this change in
legal principle, at least as applied to cases in which a large social group
is subjected to the danger of recurring accident and a more equitable
distribution of the loss is mandatory.
The state, says L6ffler, has escaped this obvious duty up to'the present time because our feelings of law and equity are directed more toward
property than toward liberty. Theft is a more reprehensible act than
intentional personal injury and false imprisonment. The taking of private property, the killing of a man's diseased animal-these were recognized as subjects for compensation long before the taking of his liberty.
L5ffier ascribes this largely to the fact that the owners of property are
a powerful social group and have induced an early social and legislative
recognition of their rights, whereas those affected by wrongful arrest or
conviction are a weak social group, whose voice is almost unheard, and
whose rights are only at this late day securing slight recognition because
of a general altruistic feeling of social justice.
It requires no further demonstration therefore to show that society
rather than the individual should bear the risk of accident in the admin36
Bamford v. Turnley, Law Times Rep., v. 6, N. S. 721 at p. 723. The principle qui jure suo utitur neminen laedit may be directly traced to Justinian's
Digest 50. 17. 151-nento damnum facit, nisi qui id fecit quod facere ]us non
habet. It has, however, always been narrowly limited. See Blackstone III, 217,
citing Morley v. Pragnel, Cro. Car. 510..
3
TL6ffler, Op. cit., p. 10. For examples of such action, see Unger, Joseph.
Handeln auf eigene Gefahr, 3rd ed., Wien, 1904.
38 Ives v. South Buffalo Street Railway Company, 201 New York, 271,
at pp. 285, 293-4, 298. See 46 American Law Review (1912), pp. 99-100, citing
article by James Parker Hall in Journal of Political Economy, October, 1911.
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istration of criminal justice. Legislation having this end in view is
supported by the same theory as compulsory social insurance, and general average in admiralty law. Where the common interest is joined
for a common end, each indiv idual member being subject to the same
danger, the loss, when it occurs, should be borne by the community and
not alone by the injured individual.
THE STATUTES.

An analysis of the European statutes may be useful to show particularly the limitations which European countries have placed on the
granting of the indemnity. It will be seen that they have endeavored tq
restrict the indemnity to those only who are clearly shown to deserve it:.
Therefore, first, the class that has the right to receive the indemnity is
strictly defined; secondly, to exclude the undeserving, specific and general limitations on the igit are established from various points of view,
such as censurable conduct of the claimant; thirdly, the injury indemnified is in general confined to the pecuniary loss only; fourthly, a very
brief statute of limitations is provided; and lastly, the indemnity is in
other respects restricted so that the burden on the State Treasury will
not be oppressive. The debates preceding the enactment of many of the
statutes show clearly that the fear of inroads on the State Treasury prevented the extension of the right and the removal of limitations in cases
where an award was otherwise recognized as just. We shall discuss the
statutes under the four heads: (a) who may be indemnified; (b) the
limitations on the right; (c) the extent of the indemnity; and (d) the
procedure for making the right effective.
WHO IS INDEMNIFIED.

As we have seen, Austria, France, Portugal and Geneva (code of
criminal procedure, January 1," 1885), grant an indemnity for the injury suffered by reason of coniction and imprisonment where on retrial
an acquittal takes place. Indemnification both for acquittal on appeal
after a conviction, and for detention pending trial followed by acquittal
or discharge is provided for in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany,
Hungary, Berne, Fribourg, Neuchatel, Basle and Tessin.- The award of an
indemnity is compulsory in case of acquittal on appeal after a conviction-that is, a right of action is given to the individual-in Germany,
Norway, Denmark, EHungary, Portugal, Mlexico, Neuchatel ",and Basle.'
It is also compulsory in case of detention followed by a discharge from
custody or acquittal on first trial in Germany, Denmark and Norway.
In Germany, however, before the action lies, the court acquitting the
accused on retrial, must, simultaneously with the judgment of acquittal,
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issue a decree to the effect that an indemnity in the case is warranted
by the facts, which decree is a condition precedent to the right of action.
The relief is discretionary in both cases-acquittal after conviction and
detention pending trial-in Sweden and Fribourg. It is discretionary
in case of acquittal after conviction only in Austria and France, and
discretionary in cases of discharge from custody in Hungary, 'Vaud,
Neuchatel and Basle. In Norway and Vaud, it is also discretionary in
case of a nolle prosequi; in general, however, a nolle prosequi does not.
open the right to the indemnity at all, a valid judgment or order of
the court being required. It is explained by the committee report on
the French law that the indemnity was left discretionary with the judge
for the reason that it was considered best, instead of making the relief
compulsory and specifying the conditions which limited the right, to
prescribe no conditions, leaving the judge to determine in each case
the effect to be given to the concrete circumstances in limiting the propriety of an award.
Innocence must be shown affirmatively on the part of the
claimant

in France, Germany, Norway, Hungary, Sweden, Mexico and Neuchatel. In Gelmany the claimant may show in the alternative that
there is no longer a well-founded suspicion against him. In Hungary
and in Sweden in case of unjust detention pending trial he must -show
any one of three things: First, in both countries, that the act for
which he is held has not been' committed. Second, in Hungary, that
the accuser has not committed it; in Sweden, that its author was another
than the accused. Third, 'in Sweden, that from all the circumstances
it could not have been committed by him; in Hungary, that while committed by him it was not in a legal sense a pLmishable act.
Hungary makes an interesting distinction between cases of unjust
conviction and cases merely of unjust detention pending trial.
In the first case, where the sentence has been served, damages are due
ipso facto, even though there is a non liquet acquittal. The not guilty
are indemnified. In the second case, where as we have seen the award
of an indemnity is discretionary, innocence must, nevertheless, be
proved. The innocent only are indemnified. While this is not clearfrom the statute itself, the committee reports leave no doubt on the subject.39 In this respect, the Hungarian law occupies an intermediate
position between the two extremes. In cases of -unjust conviction, Hungary has followed the Danish law; in cases of unjust detention, where
proof of innocence is required, the Norwegian law has been accepted as
a prototype.
39

Dolcshall, Op. cit., p. 271.
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Bonneville de Mlarsangy, an ardent proponent of state indemnity,
advocated that.innocence be proved affirmatively by the claimant, a&
this was a new action, and on the plaintiff should fall the burden of
proof. Thip theory was strenuously opposed by Ileinze, 40 who in 1865
brought the subject prominently before the public in Germany, and by
Zucker and Geyer, who claimed that our criminal law recognizes only
one form of guilt or innocence-the state must prove a man guilty or
else he is innocent. It would make an odious distinction between those
acquitted with and without indemnity, between those proven innocent
and those acquitted for lack of sufficient proof of guilt. As we have seen,
however, a number of states have adopted the principle that innocence
must be affirmatively proved by the claimant.
Other states do not require proof of innocence, but base the indemnity upon the mere fact of acquittal or discharge from custody, as for
example, Austria, Denmark, Baselstadt and Tessin. In case of erroneous conviction, Denmark requires that it be "regularly proved that the
penalty was not justificd." Some of the Swiss cantons show peculiar
conditions in this respect. Berne in its penal code of 1854 permits in
the alternative the establishment of innocence, acquittal because of
doubtful guilt, and nolle prosequi for insufficiency of evidence, which is
a most liberal if not a hazardous extension of the right. Fribourg in
its code of criminal procedure of 1873 indemnifies acquitted, nolle
prossed and not guilty "convicted persons." Vaud strangely enough in
its code of criminal procedure of 1850, indemnified persons nolle gyrossed
but not those acquitted by valid judgment. Luzerne in § 313 of its
code of criminal procedure requires that the accused should have been
prosecuted without basis (auf ganz grundloser Weise). By this is
meant the absence of suspicious conduct, lying, attempt to run away,
to conceal evidence, etc.,-what the Germans call prozessuales Verschulden.
It is curious to note that in Schwyz and Zurich where the legislator
4
has not provided for indemnity the courts have at times allowed it. 1
They have limited it to such cases as show an entire absence of guilt and
denied it where the evidence indicates a well-founded suspicion. This
tendency to base the indemnity on the probability of guilt finds strong
opponents among those authorities and courts in whose opinion mere acquittal justifies the indemnity.
The chief objections raised against the German law are that it
fails to indemnify accused innocent persons who are' nolle prossed, per40

Heinze, Rudolf. Das recbt der Untersuchungsbaft.

41

Tobler, Op. cit., p. 35.

Leipzig, 1865.

EDWIN M. BORCHARD

sons whose property has, been attached in criminal proceedings and
those who, by giving bail, have escaped detention pending trial.
There is considerable difference in the legislation of these various
countries as to the right of third persons injured by the conviction or
detention of another to sue for the indemnity. In Germany, those who
have a legal right to support from the unjustly accused person, have
an independent action, limited, however, to the amount of the support
o1g which they have been deprived. In Hungary, these same persons
have a right of action for their lost support only where the accused has
declined to bring the action himself. It is, moreover, limited to cases
of unjust conviction, and not merely unjust detention pending
trial. In Austria, a claim for lost support can be brought only by the
surviving husband or wife, children or parents, where the accused began
but dropped the action or where he -is deceased. In most countries, Germany being practically the only exception, death of the erroneously
accused (or desertion of family, as in Sweden), is a condition precedent
to the bringing of the action by third persons, either heirs or dependents. In France, Austria and Hungary the right passes to his surviving spouse, ascendants and descendaits in a direct line. In Denmark,
ascendants are excluded. In Hungary, in case the erroneously accused
person has already paid the death penalty, those who have the legal right
to support may bring the action, provided they can show that they are
dependent on the support of which they have been unjustly deprived.
Earnest objections have been raised against this limitation of the
heritability of the claim. It is said42 that the moral integrity of the
person is the common property of his family, and that damage to property rights is the basic element of the individual rights of each. Claims
of both categories, therefore, must be heritable. Legislation having in
mind only a right to support disregards these considerations. In spite
of Jellinek's assertion that this-right to indemnity is a public subjective
right, and therefore personal only, 43 most of the states of Europe have
recognized the heritability of the right so far as pecuniary damage is
concerned. Binding even recommends, and we believe properly so, that
both the moral satisfaction and the claim to pecuniary indemnity should
be transferable ab intestato. This point of view is followed by the Danish and the French law, but is rejected by the Swedish, Austrian, German and Hungarian law. In France it is provided that relatives of a
42
43

Doleshall. Op. cit., p. 274, et seq.

Jellinek, G. Staatsrechtliche Er5rterungen fiber die Entscbadigung unschuldig Verurtheilter, Zeitschrift f. d. privat- u 5ffentliche Recht der Gegenwart, v. 20, 1892, pp. 455-467.
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degree further removed than wtuld involve a material injury to them
iave no right to the claim.
(B).

LIMITATIONS.

A limitation almost uniformly expressed in the statutes is that the
claimant shall not have intentionally or by gross negligence caused his
detention. The statutes of some of the countries such as Germany,
Hungary, Norway, and Sweden, specifically mention certain limitations
in cases where the detention or conviction may be said to have been due
to the act of the claimant himself-thus, for example, where there has
been an attempt to flee, a false confession, the removal of eiddence, or an
attempt to induce a witness or an expert to give false testimony or
opinion, or an analogous attempt to suppress such testimony or opinion.
The statute of Denmark recognizes the possibility of extenuating circumstances. It is there provided, that where, for example, the attempt
to flee or the making of false statements, etc., is considered by the judge
as having been due to fear, annoyance or excusable error, he need not
refuse the indemnity. He may award an indemnity reduced in proportion to the offense.
Germany has gone furthest of all in defining the conditions and
limitations under which the claim shall be excluded. In the act of
1904, the claim may be rejected if it appears that the act charged
involved an infamous or immoral transaction, or was committed during
a state of drunkenness which excluded the exercise of free will, or when
it appears from the circumstances that the accused had prepared to
commit a felony or lesser crime. These may be called conditions of
exclusion bearing on the substantiial justice of the claim. Similar
restrictions are found in the Hungarian statute. But Germany has
gone even further and has provided expressly that certain other delinquencies of the claimant, having no connection whatever with the act
charged, shall likewise deprive him of his right to relief. Thus, article 2
of the German Act of 1904 provides that the claim may also be denied
where the accused at the time of his release is not in possession of his
civic rights, or wa7s under police surveillance, or where he has been punished or sentenced to the penitentiary and three years have not elapsedsince the termination of the sentence: In most countries these extraneous
delinquencies and their effect on the right. are left to the discretion of the
authorities passing on the claim, whether judge or administrative board.
As we have shown above, France expressly declined to specify any
limitations on the right, leaving it to the judge to determine what acts or
facts shall constitute a sufficient objection to the payment of an indem7ol
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nity.

A slight differuce between the Hungarian and Gelman statute

may here be mentioned, in that Hungary considers the failure to note

an objection or appeal against the verdict as sufficient to warrant a
denial of the indemnity, whereas Germany expressly provides that such
failure to note an appeal shall not be construed as negligence. The
draft of the proposed law of Austria governing unjust detention provides that
"Where the accused through inexcusable negligence has failed to object to
the imposition or prolongation of the detention when he had good ground so to
do, he shall be denied the award of an indemnity."

Several of the statutes exclude the remedy where the act has been
committed under duress, necessity, or self-defense, but this appears to
us as an unjust limitation.
A very brief statute of limitations is generally provided-from
three months to six months is the usual time limit for making the claim.
Denmark makes an exception in permitting the action to be brought
within a year from the day on which the accused had knowledge of the
circumstances on which he bases his demand. This provision is rather
elastic, and we have been unable to ascertain how it has been interpreted
by the courts.
(c).

EXT

T OF THE IND :NU-iTY.

As a general rule, with but few exceptions, only the pecuniary damage is compensated. In this respect, more than in any other, the statutes have fallen short of the wishes of their advocates, because in case
of an unjust detention or conviction the moral damage is by far the
more serious element of injury. Even the Carolina Code of 1532 recognized that "Schmach und Schande" (suffering and shame) were proper
elements of compensation.
Germany, Austria, Sweden and Norway indemnify for the pecuniary injuries suffered. Germany considers that these include not
merely physical injuries and lost profits, but also the losses to future
income, but they do not of course extend to moral injuries. In the
statutes indemnif3ing for erroneous conviction, it is the injury suffered
from the execution of the sentence, the actual wrongful imprisonment,
which is compensated. Sweden provides expressly that the indemnity
is to'cover the "suspension or restriction of his means of existence resulting from the deprivation of his liberty." The French, Danish and some
of the Swiss statutes are the most liberal. France provides indemnity
for the damages (dommages-interts) suffered. In practice, however,
so the authorities say, acount is taken of the moral injury resulting from
an unjust conviction, which is, indeed, hard to separate from the pecuni-
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ary. The Danish statute extends the indemnity to "the wrong, injury,
and pecuniary losses which he has suffered." Whereas most of the Swiss
codes of criminal procedure provide for indemnity without specifying
what injuries are to be indemnified, the code of criminal procedure of
Neuchatel in article 508 provides that
"In case the new decision declares the condemned person innocent, there
shall be awarded to'him by the court damages proportioned to the material and
moral injury he has suffered by the erroneous conviction."

The Hungarian statute requires first, a return of all money penalties; secondly, the return of the costs of proceedings and the value of
confiscated property; thirdly, compensation for income lost during the
-imprisonment; and fourthly, money damages may generally be granted.
How these are to be estimated and what thby are -to cover is not stated.
Whether they cover the loss of position, diminution and falling off in
business, and loss of credit, or whether they are simply confined to the
definite actual fixed property losses can not be established. The commiftee reports (motives) lead to the inference that more than the property loss was intended to be covered, for the Swedish and Austrian statutes are characterized as unsatisfactory in this regard. It may be stated
in addition that it is the general rule in Europe to provide in the codes
of criminal procedure for a return of costs to an accused person declared
to be innocent.
The French law notes an express difference between material and
moral injuries in the matter of heritability. Both pecuniary and moral
losses are the subject of indemnity on the part of those who are sufficiently near in relationship to the accused for the presumption to be
drawn that they have suffered by the conviction of their relative. But,
as we have shown, the right is not extended to relatives of a degree further removed than would involve a material injury resulting to them
from the unjust conviction.
It is curious to note that the draft of the proposed Austrian law
according indemnity for unjust detention, denies any indemnity for a
detention of less than eight days. The debates show that this is based
on financial considerations. The German statute of 1904 similarly
excludes from indemnity the mere arrest and detention preliminary to
c6mmitment for trial, except when followed- by detention pending trial,
in which latter event the preliminary detention is calculated as a part
of the whole. This limitation is unjust, and is so recognized by the
commission redrafting the Code of Criminal Procedure, 4 who recommend indemnification even for a brief preliminary detention. Only
44Protokolle der Kommission zur Reform des Strafprozesses; II, p. 284, ff.
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where the arrest is followed by almost immediate release, where there is
practically no real detention, is an indemnity, says the commission,
unnecessary. A provable injury is in such cases, in the opinion of the
commissioners, generally impossible. To us, this proposition seems open
to debate, at least.
In general the statutes recognize the obligation to accord satisfaction for the moral injury by providing for the publication of the decree
of acquittal at the domicil of the accused,45 at the jurisdiction of the
appellate court, and at various other places, which presumably will aid
the accused to obviate and allay any prejudice from which he may have
suffered by the publication of the fact of his detention or conviction.
France goes the furthest in this direction, providing that
"The decree or judgment on appeal whence results the innocence of a convicted person shall be posted in the city where the conviction was first pronounced; in the place where the judgment was reversed; in the community or
place where the crime or misdemeanor shall have been committed; at the domicil of those who demanded the appeal; and at the last domicil of the victim of
the judicial error, if he is deceased, and shall be officially published in the
Journal Oficiel, and its publication in five newspapers, at the choice of the appellant, shall be ordered besides, if he requests it."
(D).

PROEDuXI.

As will be seen from the statutes quoted in the Appendix, the procedure is generally very complicated; in fact so complicated that it is
hard to understand how the poor acquitted individual thrown out on the
world can ever find the means to prosecute his claim. The statutes
vary greatly from one another, only one country, Denmark, making it
a right justiciable before the ordinary courts in first instance. In general, it is regarded as an administrative proceeding, which perhaps more
than anything else shows that the indemnity is considered an act of
grace and not a matter of legal right. Sweden requires that the claim
shall be addressed to the King and shall be examined by the Minister of
Justice, who is to pass ujon the justice of the claim and the amount of
the indemnity. In Austria the trial court pronouncing the acquittal
makes an official inquiry into the facts on which the claim for indemnity
isbased, and the sealed documents w ith an opinion of the court are
then laid before the Ministeyr of Justice, who in turn fixes the amount
of the award. An appeal from his finding lies to the Supreme Court.
In Hungary the trial court makes the investigation, places its findings
before the highest court, which in turn, should it decide that the indem' The codes of criminal procedure often provide for the publication of the
judgment of acquittal in the Official Gazette (Reichsanzeiger).- see, for example,
the German Strafprozessordnung, sec. 411, paragraph 4.
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nity is justified, sends the papers to the Minister of Justice. On the
basis of the findings of the highest court, the Minister of Justice fixes
the amount of the indemnity.
In Germany, whose statute is the latest, it is provided that the
second trial court, besides its decree of acquittal, shall hand down a
decree as to whether an indemnity in the case is warranted by the facts
disclosed.4 6 This decree can not be appealed from. If it decides in
favor of the claimant, he must make a formal application for indemnification to the district attorney in the jurisdiction where the trial court
sat. The district attorney as a ministerial act sends the papers to the
highest administrative board of the state (Landesjustizverwaltung).
This board fixes the amount of indemnity, from which an appeal through
the regular legal channels is granted to the claimant. Germany, therefore, has at least made this concession to those who have always contended
that the right to indemnity is a strictly legal right and should be justiciable in the law courts.
Practically all the statutes provide that the state shall have a subrogated right against those individuals, officers or judges who by their
negligence, corruption, or malicious conduct shall have caused or contributed to the detention or to its undue prolongation, or to the conviction of the innocent accused person.
CONCLUSION.

Such are the salient features of the more important European
statutes on indemnification by the state of those whom, in the administration of its criminal justice, it has erroneously and unjustly arrested,
detained or convicted. The principle has been clearly recognized, but
as the examination of the statutes discloses the remedy in practice is
granted only within the narrowest of limits. Nevertheless, a step has
been taken in the right direction and one which we in this country would
low we shall apply the principle, whether the relief
do well to follow.
shall be compulsory or discretionary, whether court or jury shall estimate the extent of the injury, within what limits and under what conditions the indemnity shall be awarded, are matters which legislatures
can work out with little difficulty. While it is true that'our lax methods
of administering the criminal law, the possibility of acquittal on teqli
nical grounds 47 and the requirement of unainimity on the part of twelve
jurymen, bring about nine cases .of unjust acquittal to one case of unjust conviction, still the mere rarity of the occurrence is no excuse for a
46

For an example of such a decree, see Krause, Op. cit,. p. 2i3.
for example, People v. Flack, 125 Neir York, 324; also. the Illinois
.
.
case~cited in Green Bag for June, 1912, p. 321.
4

7See,
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failure to acknowledge the principle and to remedy the evil. It makes the
individual hardship, when it does occur, seem all the more distressing.
That there have been numerous cases of this kind besides the recent
Toth case in Pennsylvania and the Beck case in England there is no
doubt, notwithstanding the unauthentic returns from wardens collected
by the American Prison Congress and reported in this Journal (May,
1912, p. 131) to the effect that there are but few cases of unjust execution of innocent persons.48 The whole matter of compensation for
unjust convictions for felonies and lesser crimes is well worth further
study, to the end that within measurable time remedial legislation may
cure this defect in our social institutions.
APPENDIX:

C6NTINENTAL STATUTES.

Spain-Penal Code of 1822, chap. 12. In force for 15 months. Articles 179-181
'deal with indemnity for. innocent persons. Revie Penitentiaire, v. 19, 1895,

pp. 568-9.
Article 179. Every individual who, after having been the object of a criminal proceeding, shall have been declared absolutely innocent of the crime or
fault to which the proceeding is due shall be immediately and completely indemnified for all the injuries and wrong experienced by him in his person, reputation and property, and there may not be required of him for this purpose any
costs or expenses, and, if he desires, a fiscal attorney shall be charged with representing him in this demand for indemnity as if it concerned a claim advanced
ex officio. However, wherever it is not impossible the indemnity shall be fixed
in the same sentence which declares the accused absolutely innocent. If this
proceeding is not possible the right to indemnity shall be declared and the indemnity fixed as it is prescribed in the code of procedure.
Art. i8o. If the criminal action has been instituted by virtue of a private
accusation the indemnity shall be at the charge of the accuser; and if the judge

has co-operated by dolus, ignorance or negligence in the injustice of the information, he will incur the same responsibility in solido.
Art. z~i. If the proceeding has been instituted ex officio and it has as
its cause the dolus or fault of the judge the indemnity shall be integrally
charged to said judge. If the judge on the contrary has acted in conformity
with the law and it results from the information that the individual accused
was absolutely innocent, the indemnity shall be given by the government either
in money or under the form of an honor or recompense according to the circumstances of the person, which .will be determined by the sentence, but it
shall always be effective and sufficient to extend to all the injuries, wrongs and
annoyances experienced by the innocent person.
Btile-Ville (Baselstadt)-Law of December 9, 1889, on the indemnity accorded
to those who have been unjustly incarcerated. Aumaire de Ligislation
Etrangire,v. 19, 1889, pp. 685-6.
Art. i. When a person has been incarcerated by order of the authorities,
48A large collection of cases of unjust executions-and sentences of life imprisonment has recently been published by Justizrat Dr. Erich Sello: Die Irrtiner
der Strafiustiz und ihre Ursachen, Berlin, R. v. Decker's Verlag, 1911. Volume
I, 523 p. Quarto.
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if the proceeding instituted against him has not ended in the remanding of
the accused to the courts, he has a right at the end of the examination to an
indemnity proportioned to the wrong wvhich has been caused him and the duration of the incarceration, provided that there has been no fault on his part.
Art. 2. The claims for indemnity based on article 1 of the present law
must be brought within fifteen days of the end of the proceeding which led
to the incarceration, under penalty of being rejected. If the release and termination of the examination are the work of the police, the police must pronounce on the indemnity. Otherwise the claim is addressed to the authority
which remands the individual.
Art. 3. Appeal is allowed against the decision of the police or other
authority by making, within seven days from liberation from detention, a
written complaint, with the grounds stated, to the president of the tribunal or
the court of appeal.
Art. 4. The commission of the court of appeal, in article 31 of the law
relating to the opening of criminal procedure of November 4, 1841, shall pass
upon the complaint presented in accordance with article 3 of the present law.
Art. 5. The commission decides after having heard the authority charged
with pronouncing the remanding or the police, and heard sufficient testimony on
the basis of the amount of the claim to indemnity.
If the commission rejects the complaint the claimant may, under the head
of expenses be compelled to pay up to one hundred francs.
Art. 6. The accused persons who have been liberated by a competent judge
may demand of the state an indemnity proportioned to the wrong which has been
caused them by the order of incarceration, and to the duration of the detention
provided, nevertheless, that they 'shall not have been incarcerated by their
fault.
Art. 7. When a criminal proceeding is reheard by the terms of articles
121 and 130 of the code of criminal procedure and results in an acquittal, or
when it is recognized that the accused deserved a less penalty than that inflicted
upon him, he may claim an indemnity proportioned to the pecuniary damage of
all kinds which has resulted to him from the detention he has suffered (detention during the examination and detention as a penalty) provided, nevertheless, by his conduct he has not deserved condemnation.
Art. 8. The claim for indemnity based on the provisions of articles 6 and
7 of the present law may, as a general rule, be awarded immediately after the
publication of the decree by the same tribunal which has ordered the liberation
of the individual, or the diminution of the penalty. The claim must be decided
after the public authorities have been heard.
By exception the tribunal may postpone the decision. The injured person
may likewise demand a delay of fifteen days during which he may present his
demand for indemnity. After that period all claim to indemnity is barred.
The tribunal decides in last resort on the demands of indemnity submitted to it.
Art. 9. The competent authorities shall fix freely, taking account of all
the circumstances, the amount of the indemnity which ought to be accorded by
the terms of the present law.
Art. 'o. The demands instituted by the terms of this law, pass to the
heirs after the death of the principal claimant.
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Art. ji. No demand for indemnity can be directed against the officials
who in the exercise of their functions have ordered a detention pending trial,
or a detention as penalty. On the other, hand, the state may reimburse itself
from its guilty employees in case of gross negligence for the amount of the
indemnity which it has had to pay in conformity with the provisions of the
present law.
Art. 12. Paragraph 63 and 101 of the code of criminal procedure of May
5, 1862, on indemnities due to convicted persons are abrogated from the 'day
the present law enters into force.
Mexico-Penal Code of Dec. 7, 1871.
Art. 344. If the accused has been acquitted by the court, not because of
failure of proof, but because his complete innocence of the crime with which
he was charged has been established, and if he had not by his previous conduct provoked the presumption of his guilt, this shall be expressly stated"in
the judgment of' acquittal;, and when the accused demands it, the amount of his
damage and lost profits which the proceeding has caused-him shall be fixed in
the judgment, after the district attorney has been heard.' "In this case the civil
responsibility is paid out of the general indemnity funds, if by section 348 the
judges do not appear responsible or are without sufficient means to pay.
Art. 345. The unjustly accused has a right of action against his unlawfully
complaining witness or informant.
Art. 348. The judges and other public officials, employees or officers are
civilly liable for arbitrary or wrongful arrests which they have ordered; for
illegal prolongation of imprisonment, for injuries caused by ignorance or tardiness in the transaction of their business; and for all misdemeanors.or -crime
which they commit in the exercise of their functions and whereby injury is
caused to others.Portugal-PenalCode of June 14, 1884, Art. 126, Sec. 6, and 7.
Sec. 6. ,The judgment of acquittal on appeal from a conviction entitles
the wrongfully accused person (if he demands it) to an equitable indemnity for
the injury which he has suffered through his imprisonment, if the penalty has
not been a- money fine. If the penalty has been a money fine already paid,
it shall be refunded to him. The refunding and the indemnity are charged
to the state.
Sec. 7. The judgment of acquittal shall be published in the Official Gazette
on three successive days and in duly authenticated form, shall be fastened to
the door of the district court where the unjustly convicted person resides, and on
the door of the district court, where the conviction has taken place.
The Rehabilitation of duly acquitted persons in Portugal. Decree of Feb. 27,
1895. The law of June 14, 1884, revising the penal code enumerates the
means of bringing about rehabilitation. Revue Penitentiaire, v. 19, 1895,
pp. 920-21.
Article Ti. If the accused is' declared not guilty the new judgment shall
declare void the-judgment of conviction without reference to the provisions of
the penal law and must rehabilitate the condemned before society, permit him
to again occupy his legal status before conviction, as soon as the judgment
shall have secured binding force. An extract of the judgment shall be published in the Official Gazette on three consecutive days and attached to the door
of the court in the jurisdiction of the domicil of the rehabilitated person and to
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the door of the court of the jurisdiction in which the conviction was pronounced. Mention in the judicial statistics must be suppressed.
The public minister must furnish the legal means.
Art. 12. The judgment must award to the condemned person, if he
requests it, a just indemnity for the injury suffered by the execution of the
penalty, if there exist in the proceedings sufficient elements to appreciate this
injury. In the contrary case, the indemnity must be fixed in an ordinary proceeding according to the legislation in force. If the penalty has been a fine
and already paid the judgment must order its restitution.
Art. x5. It shall be permitted to revise and rehear the proceedings and
judgment of a deceased convicted person, observing the previous provisions.
Art. 16. The only persons competent to demand this revision are the
parents, descendants, spouse and brothers and sisters of the convicted person.
Sweden-Law of March 12, 1886, Concerning Indemnity to be Awarded against
the State to Those Innocently Arrested or Convicted. Lag, angaende ersi.ttning af allm~nna medel at oskyldigt hdiktade eller d6mde; given Stockholms slott den 12 Mars 1886. Svensk F6rfattnings-Samling. Number 8,
1886. Translated into French in Annutaire de Ligislation Etrangire, v.
16, pp. 591-2.
Article r. When an individual shall have been arrested as guilty of a
crime and the prosecution against him shall have been subsequently abandoned,
or the accused shall have been acquitted, there may be awarded to him, or in
his default, to his wife or abandoned children, to be borne by the state, an
indemnity for the suspension or restriction of his means of existence resulting from the deprivation of his liberty, if it results from the proceedings that
the crime for which he has been prosecuted has not been committed, or that
its author was another than the accused, or that from all the circumstances it
could not have been committed by him, and if in the two latter cases he cannot be considered as an accomplice.
This indemnity shall not be awarded to him who has sought by flight or
otherwise to escape the examination or to prevent the discovery of the truth
by the suppression of evidence or objects, nor to him who intentionally by an
untruthful statement made in court or elsewhere, or by falsely denouncing
himself, or in any other way shall have been the cause of the proceedings
which have been instituted or prosecuted against him.
Article 2. When an individual condemned to forced labor or prison or to
fines, converted into a penalty depriving him of liberty, shall have suffered
the burden of his penalty in whole or in part and after a new inquiry or proceeding made in the regular form, he shall have been acquitted, or condemned
to a penalty less than that which he has already paid, there may be awarded
to him, or in his default to his wife or abandoned children, to be borne by the
state, an indemnity for the suspension or restriction of his means of existence
resulting from the execution of the penalty, or of that part of this penalty
from which he shall have been subsequently released, if he has not intentionally
by an untruthful statement made in court or elsewhere, or -by denouncing
himself falsely, or in any other way, caused the penalty he has suffered to have
been pronounced against him.
Article 3. A request for indemnity within the provisions of this law shall
be addressed to the King and shall, to be examined, be presented to the Min709
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ister of Justice within a period of a year beginning in the case provided for
in article 1 from the day when the decision to abandon the prosecution or
acquit the accused shall have become res judidata, and in the case of article 2
from the day when the judgment pronouncing the acquittal of the accused or
his condemnation to'a penalty less than that already suffered shall have acquired
the force of res judicata.
Article 4. When an indemnity shall have been awarded within the terms of
this law to an individual imprisoned or condemned in violation of the law, the
State shall have the right of recourse against him or those who shall be responsible for the imprisonment or judgment.
Nor-uay-The law of criminal procedure of July 1, 1887 (Jury law) Lov om
rettergangsmaaden i straffesager, 1 Juli, 1887, No. 5, Sections 469-472. Norsk
Lovtidende, 1887, p. 200 at pp. 285-6.
Section 469. When an individual is acquitted by a judgment after having
already paid a penalty under previous conviction he shall on demand be paid
from the Treasury, an indemnity for the damages which he has suffered by
reason of the executed judgment.
For damages suffered during detention pending trial a person who has been
discharged from prosecution, or who is acquitted by judgment, shall, on his demand, receive indemnity from the Treasury, if he successfully rebuts the proofs
on which his guilt was predicated.
If the discharge from prosecution or the acquittal is based upon the fact
that the transaction can not be brought within a provision of the penal law, or
that punishment is excluded or suspended by reason of a circumstance recognized by the law, the court shall decide according to the circumstances of the
case how far such indemnity is due.
Sec. 470. Indemnity is never to be granted where the accused by confession
or otherwise through intentional conduct had provoked the judgment of conviction or the prosecution against himself, nor for detention pending examination which has occurred because the accused has attempted to flee or has so
acted that the conclusion had to be drawn that he has sought to remove traces
of the deed, or induce others to bear false witness, or to suppress their testimony.
Sec. 471. The fixing of the indemnity mentioned in section 469 may be demanded in the judgment or in the decree by which the case is terminated.
If this has not occurred or if the prosecution is abandoned without judgment or decree the accused may, within a month after the receipt of the notice,
bring his demand before the court which had jurisdiction of the criminal prosecution, or if this cannot be done, before a court which might have had original
jurisdiction over the case. The decision takes place by decree after the prosecuting attorney shall have been given an opportunity to defend the interests of
the Treasury. If the Treasury is charged with a liability such as is here in question, it can make the claim which the accused would have had by virtue of section 466.
Sec. 466. "For negligent or otherwise improper conduct, so long as they
are engaged on a case, public officers as well as private attorneys may be punished with fines, in so far as no greater penalty is by law applicable in the
case, and damages are charged to them for the benefit of the person injured

INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
by their action. For the damages charged to a public officer, -the State is
equally responsible.
The State is not, however, responsible to a defendant for duties which
an attorney according to section 107 should fulfil."
Sec. 472. If appeal is raised against a judgment on which this chaptet provides legal liability the highest court, ex officio, examines the question';of liability
in so far as the decision of this question depends on the ground of -appeal; but
further examination takes place only in so far as the appeal on this matter has
been demanded by one of the-parties. * *
Denmark-Law of April 5, 1888, on Indemnity for Unjust Detention and Convictiont and on the Payment in Certain Cases of the Expenses of Appeals Instituted Officially. (Lov om Erstatning for uforskyldt Varelaegtsfaefngsel og
Straf efter Dom saint om Udredelse i visse Tilfelde of Sagens Omkostningeri offentlige Straffesager, Sanling af Love of Anordninger,vol. 11, 1886-90,
pp. 242-244). (Translated into French in Aunnaire de Ligislation trangire, v. 18, 1888, pp. 752-754).
Article i. He who, after having been subjected to detention pending trial,
shall be subsequently acquitted or released without his case having been prosecuted to judgment, has a right to indemnity to be fixed by the judge for the
wrong, injury, and pecuniary losses which he has suffered, by reason of being
deprived of his liberty, when it results necessarily from the explanations furnished that he was innocent of the wrongful act for which he was detained.
An equal right to such an indemnity belongs to him who has been subjected
to detention pending trial by reason of inculpation in an act forbidden by' a
criminal law, but not involving a penalty greater than a fine or simple imprisonment.
Article 2. The right to indemnity above mentioned ceases when the accused
has by his conduct provoked his detention pending trial. Nevertheless, when the
judge recognizes that the suspected conduct of the accused may have been due
to fear, annoyance or excusable error, he may award him an indemnity reduced
in proportion.
Article 3. If the case goes to judgment without any accusation against the
accused, the latter may, if he desires, demand that the indemnity due him be
fixed by judgment pronounced when the case terminates. Nevertheless, the
superior authority (in Copenhagen, the director of police) shall be advised in
time sufficient to defend the public Treasury.
In all other cases the demand for indemnity for detention pending trial shall
be the object of a special civil suit against the State. The summons shall be
served on the prefect (in Copenhagen, the director of police) and on the examining magistrate who conducts the proceedings.
The claimant may bring his case before the tribunal of first instance in the
place where he has been detained or directly to the superior court having jurisdiction over the examining magistrate, provided that it be not the Supreme
Court. This action shall be without expense for either party, and the defendant
charged with the interests of the State shall likewise take charge of the interests of the examining magistrate.
When the criminal action or judgment on the detention is appealed to a
superior judge, the claim for an indemnity may be formulated and the judgment
may be requested in the course of the appellate action. In that case the public
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minister is charged with defending the interests of the examining magistrate and
those of the Treasury.
The decision of the judge of first instance on the demand for indemnity for
detention pending trial may be appealed from by the accused as well as by the
public minister without limitation of amount.
Article 4. Every action for indemnity for unjust detention pending trial
shall be brought within a year from the day when the accused had knowledge of
the circumstances on 'vhich he bases his demand. If his *demand is considered
without basis, he shall be condemned to pay the expenses of the case.
Article 5. When a penalty pronounced by the judgment has been paid or
expiated in whole or in part and it is regularly proved that the penalty was not
justified, the condemned person has a right to an indemnity against the public
Treasury for the wrong, injury, and pecuniary losses resulting to him.
The action for indemnity shall be instituted before the tribunal of first instance which had jurisdiction of the criminal case, service to be made on the
superior authority and on that one or those of the judges who pronounced the
conviction, or directly before the court immediately above, provided that it be
not the Supreme Court. The provisions of article 3 concerning the actioni for
indemnity for detentiQn pending trial shall apply moreover to the actions here
in question.
Article 6. The right of action for pecuniary losses, after the death of the
accused, passes to his spouse and to his descendants.
Article 7. 'The indemnities awarded in execution of the present law shall
be paid by the Treasury, which shall have recourse against the judge when the
latter shall have been guilty of abuse of authority, negligence, or other inexcusable fault.
Article 8. In case of acquittal of the accused, and in general in all cases
where the action ends without resulting in a conviction, the expense of the penal
action prosecuted officially shall be borne by the Treasury, unless it shall have
been occasioned in whole or in part by an illegitimate act imputable to the accused.
Austria-Law of March 16, 1892, Number 64, Reichsgesetzblatt, 1892, pp. 477-8.
Law concerning indemnity for unjust conviction.
§ 1. He who has been legally convicted of a criminal act in accordance
with the provisions of the code of criminal procedure, if on a new trial, the discontinuance of the prosecution or the rejection of the charge results, and furthermore in all cases in which acquittal subsequently takes place, may demand of
the State an indemnity for the pecuniary injuries- suffered by reason of the unjust conviction.
The claim is not permissible when the convicted person has intentionally
brought about the unjust conviction or in case of a verdict obtained by contumacy has failed to make objection or take exception.
§ 2. Assuming the presence of the conditions of § 1, the claim may after
the death of the convicted person be brought, or if begun by him continued, only
by his spouse, children and parents, and only to the extent that these relatives
are by his wrongful conviction deprived of support which was due to them from
the accused.. '
§ 3. The claim is barred after three months from the day on which under
sections 1 and 2 the claim might have been first brought.
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§ 4. The claim is to be brought by written request or protocol before the
trial court of first instance which rendered the verdict of conviction and is to
be made as definite as possible.
§ S. The court is officially to undertake the necessary proceedings to establish the facts on which the claim is based, and may take the necessary proofs.
All the circumstances for and against the claim are to be considered with equal
care. Witnesses and experts may be called and oaths administered where
necessary.
§ 6. When the inquiry is closed, the claimant is to be notified that he may
make further statements in writing to justify his claim, for which purpose he is
to have 14 days' time. The claimant may see the papers in the case.
§ 7. The sealed documents together with an opinion of the court is to be
laid before the Minister of Justice who may request, a supplementary inquiry or
further explanations. The Minister of Justice takes jurisdiction over the claim
and fixes the amount of the indemnity.
§ 8. The claimant has a period of 60 days to appeal from the finding of
the Minister of Justice to the Supreme Court. The period can not be extended
under any circumstances, nor can the extension be granted for default. The
appeal does not require the signature of an attorney.
§ 9. The proceedings in the matter regulated by this statute and the relevant memorials are free from fees and postage.
§ 10. The law does not apply to convictions pronounced before the coming into force of this act.
France-Law of June 8, 1895, on the Revision of Criminal Judgments and
Indemnities to the Victims of Judicial Errors. Bulletin No. 1706, Bulletin
des Lois, 1895. This law is substituted for chap. 3, book 2, title 3, of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 443-447.
Articles 443 to 445 inclusive deal with the procedure for reopening a conviction for a criminal act. Article 446 deals with the matter of indemnity for
the innocent victim of errors of criminal justice and reads as follows:
Article 446. The decree or judgment of reversal whence results the innocence of a convicted person may, on his demand, award him damages for the injury caused him by the conviction.
If the victim of the judicial error is deceased, the right to demand the damages belongs under the same conditions to his spouse, ascendants and descendants (in a direct line).
It shall not belong to relatives of a degree further removed than would involve a material injury resulting to them from the conviction.
The claim for indemnity may be made at.any stage of the procedure for the
reversal of the original judgment.
The damages awarded shall be against the State, except that the latter has
recourse against the civil person, the complaining or informing witness or false
witness through whose fault the conviction shall have been pronounced. The
damages shall be paid as expenses of criminal justice. The expenses of the appeal for reversal shall be advanced by the appellant up to the order of the court
taking jurisdiction of the claim for indemnity; the expense after that order
shall be paid by the Treasury of the State.
If the decree or definite judgment on appeal pronounces a conviction, the
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condemned person shall be compelled to reimburse" the expenses to the State, or
to those who demanded the appeal, if there are such.
He who demands the appeal for reversal of the first judgment and loses
shall be held to pay all the expenses.
The decree or judgment on appeal whence results the innocence of a convicted person shall be posted in the city where the conviction was first pronounced; in the place where the judgment was reversed; in the community or
place where the crime or misdemeanor shall have been committed; at the domicil of those who demanded the appeal; and at the last domicil of the victim
of the judicial error, if he is deceased, and shall be officially published in the
Journal Qfficiel, and its publication in five newspapers, at the choice of the appellant, should be ordered besides, if he requests it.
The expenses of publicity here provided for shall be borhe by the Treasury.
Hungary-Code of Criminal Procedure, December 4, 1896, Gesetzsamnnig,
1896, pp. 664, et seq. Indemnity in cases of unjust arrest, detention and
'punishment. Sections 576, et seq.
§ 576. He whom the court has legally acquitted of the charge against him
or who has been discharged from prosecution, has a claim to indemnity when he
has suffered arrest or detention for an act;
First, which he has not committed;
Second, which has not been committed at all;
Third, which he has indeed committed but which in the legal sense is not a
punishable act.
§ 577. An indemnity for a temporary arrest or detention pending trial can
not be claimed by a person who
First, has attempted to flee or has fled;
Second, has made a false confession or false avowal of the crime;
Third, to remove evidence of the deed, has sought to induce a witness or
fellow accused to bear false witness or an expert to give a false opinion, or
sought to suppress the testimony or opinion as the case may be.
§ 578. He who on the basis of a valid legal judgment has been deprived of
his liberty or paid a money fine or from whom such fine has been exacted has
a claim for indemnity;
First, when on rehearing of his case he is legally acquitted by a valid judgment;
Second, when on the rehearing or new trial a lesser penalty is prescribed
against him than the one which he has already borne on the basis of the first
judgment now declared invalid.
§ 579.

An indemnity can not be demanded by one who

First, has made a false confession or a false avowal of the crime;
'Second, who in the principal proceeding has intentionally suppressed the
proofs upon which the court in the rehearing bases its judgment of acquittal;
Third, who in the proceedings establishing his guilt has not noted objections
and appealed against the verdict;
Fourth, he who has voluntarily entered on his sentence as found in the lower
court before that judgment has obtained legal force. (See § 505, paragraph 2;
sec. 549, paragraph 1).
§ 580. Indemnity is made by the State.
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The indemnity covers a commensurate monetary compensation embracing the
sum which the convicted person has paid as money fine and -as court costs, the
value of the objects which had been confiscated from him on the basis of section 63 of law 5 of the year 1878, and the sums which he has earned during the
period of his wrongful imprisonment. Moreover, the court order establishing
indemnity is to be published in the Official Gazette and in the official paper of
the district where the court sits, or in i newspaper within the immediate vicinity,
at the expense of the funds of the court, and is to be publicly displayed by the
local authorities of the jurisdiction of the court and of the domicil of the accused, at a place designated by them.
§ 581. The claim to indemnity is barred when the individual does not make
known his claim within six months from the time of notice served on him of the
decree dischafging him from prosecution, or of the judgment of acquittal.
§ 582. Those who by law or legally recognized custom have the right to
demand support from the accused having such claim to indemnity, may in case
of his declining to sue make a claim set forth in § 580 for this purpose. They
may, if the accused has brought his action within the period prescribed in § 581,
request the continuance of the proceedings; if, however, the unjustly accused
has died before the expiration of that period without bringing his action for indemnity, these persons may within six months from the day of his death request
the institution of the proceedings.
§ 583. In cases where a valid judgment establishes that an individual who
has suffered a death penalty would have been legally acquitted, those dependents who had a right to support from him may, if they are dependent upon this
support, bring an action for pecuniary compensation for the support of which
they have been deprived. With reference to the publication of the decree awarding indemnity the provisions of the last paragraph of § 580 are to be applied
with the modification that the decree is to be publicly displayed by the local
authorities of the last domicil of the accused, and, also, if requested by them, in
the domicil of his relatives, if they reside at another place. In the case of this
paragraph the period prescribed in § 581 is to be reckoned from the day on which
the decree discharging him from prosecution, or of acquittal, comes into legal
force.
§ 584. The action for indemnity is to be brought in the court before which
the criminal proceedings were brought in first instance, or in the judicial circuit
in which that court of first instance belongs.
§ 585. The proceedings for indemnity may be instituted verbally or in
writing.
§ 586. The court must investigate the data necessary to establish the indemnity through official channels, and may demand evidence from both the
wrongfully accused and from the public prosecutor.
The court may call witnesses and experts. Before the end of the investigation the wrongfully accused is to be informed that his remarks and motions
must be handed in in writing within eight days.
§ 587. At the end of the investigation the court places its findings before
the royal Kurie, or highest court, which, in case it decides that the claim for indemnity is justified, sends the papers to the Minister of Justice. On the basis
of the findings of the royal Kurie, the Minister of Justice fixes the amount of
the indemnity.
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§ 588. To the extent of the amount of the indemnity the State has a subrogated right against all those whose actions or omissions have contributed to
the facts making the indemnity payable.
Against the judge, court officials, or public prosecutor the State has a subrogated right only in case it is legally established that their actions or omissions
which served to bring about the indemnity may be regarded as an official breach
of duty or a punishable act. * * *
§ 589. He who by false complaint or false testimony, or a public officer
who has wrongfully brought about the arrest, detention or conviction of another, owes full inddmnity for all injuries to property which the convicted or
detained person has suffered in so far as the claim for indemnity is established
(§ 587), and the damage exceeds the sums awarded in accordance with § 580.
A person having a right to this indemnity may instead of the indemnity demand smart-money up to the amount of 2,000 kroners, which amount the court
at its discretion may fix.
Germauy-Law of May 20, 1898, Concerning Indemnity for Persons Acquitted
on New Hearing or Retrial. Reichsgesetzblatt, p. 345.
§ 1. Persons who are acquitted on a new trial, or by the application of a
milder penal law, have a lighter sentence imposed, may demand indemnity from
the Treasury if the earlier penalty has been executed in whole or in part against
them. The new trial must establish the innocence of the convicted person of
the deed charged to him, or with respect to the circumstance justifying the application of a greater penalty, or it must show that a well-founded suspicion no
longer exists against the accused.
Besides the convicted person those who are legally dependent upon him for
support have a claim to the indemnity.
The claim to indemnity is not permissible when the convicted person has intentionally or by gross negligence provoked the earlier conviction. Failure to
note an appeal is not to be considered as negligence.
§ 2. The substance of the indemnity due to the accused is the pecuniary
damage suffered by execution of the sentence. Those entitled to support have
the right to compensation to the extent that they were deprived of- support during the execution of the senfence.
§ 3. The indemnity is to be paid from the Treasury of that State of the
Empire before whose court the criminal proceeding took place in first instance.
Up to the amount of the indemnity thus paid, the Treasury is subrogated to the
rights which the accused had against third persons, because their unlawful transactions led to his conviction.
§ 4. With reference to the duty of the Treasury to award indemnity, the
appellate court in which the new trial takes place issues a special decree.
The decree is to be drawn up by the court simultaneously with the judgment. It is not to be published, but it is to be served on the person. There is
no appeal from the decree. It goes out of force if the judgment of acquittal is
reversed.
§ 5. He who makes a claim on the basis of the decree awarding indemnity
from the Treasury must bring his claim forward within three months after that'
decree has been served, by application to the public prosecutor. The application
is to be handed to the superior court (Landgericht) in whose district the judgment was rendered. The highest administrative board of the State (Laides-
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justizverwaltung) decides on the application. The decision duly drawn up is to
be served on the claimant according to the provisions of the code of civil procedure.
Against the decision appeal through legal channels is permissible. The complaint is to be brought within a period of three months after service of the decision. For the claim to indemnity the civil chamber of the superior court
(Landgericht) has exclusive jurisdiction without regard to the value of the
matter in litigation. Until the final decision on the claimant's application the
claim is not assignable or pledgable.
§ 6. For such matters as in first instance are within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, the Treasury of the Empire is chargeable with the indemnity
instead of the State Treasuries. In these cases instead of the public prosecutor
of the superior court, the public prosecutor of the Supreme Court is substituted,
and in place of the highest authorities of the State administration, the Imperial
Chancellor is substituted.
Germany-Law of July 14, 1904, concerning indemnity for unjust detention
pending trial. Reichsgesetzblatt, page 321.
§ 1. Persons who are acquitted in criminal proceedings or who are discharged from piosecution by decree of the court, may demand indemnity from
the State Treasury if the proceedings have shown their innocence or shown that
no well-founded suspicion lies against them. Besides the arrested person those
whom he has legally to support have a claim for indemnity.
§ 2. The claim td indemnity is not permissible if the arrested person has
intentionally or by gross negligence caused his detention. The failure to note
an appeal is not to be considered as negligence.
The claim may be rejected if the act of the accused subjected to examination involves an infamous or immoral act, or was-committed during a state of
drunkenness which excluded the exercise of free will, or when it appears from
the circumstances that the accused had prepared to commit a felony or lesser
crime.
The claim may also be rejected if the accused at the time of his arrest is
not in possession of his civic rights, or was under police surveillance, or when
on the basis of sections 181a and 362 of the penal code, he was placed within
the last two years under the surveillance of the police authorities. The same is
true if the accused has been-punished by sentence to the penitentiary and since
the expiration of the sentence three years have not yet elapsed.
§ 3. The substance of the indemnity paid the arrested person is the pecuniary damage suffered by his detention. If, before the issuance of the order
of detention, an arraignment or preliminary arrest has taken place, the claim
for indemnity will include the period of arrest preceding the issuance of the
order of detention.
Those entitled to support are to receive indemnity to the extent that they
were deprived of support by reason of the detention.
§ 4. On the duty of the Treasury to make compensation a special decree is
drawn up by the court at the same time as it hands down the judgment of acquittal. If on appeal from the judgment acquittal is decided anew the appellate
court must draw up a new decree on the indemnity.
The decree is not to be published, but is to be notified by personal service
as soon as the decree of acquittal has secured legal force. It can not be ap717
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pealed from. If the duty of the Treasury to make indemnity is recognized the
decree is also to be notified to those entitled to support who are not in the
household of the accused, in so far as their residence is known.
These provisions are equally applicable when the arrested person by order of
the court is released from prosecution.
§ 5. The decree holding the State responsible for indemnity loses its force
when a new .trial is ordered to the disadvantage of the acquitted prisoner, or
when the complaint in the principal action is reopened against the prisoner
against whom prosecution had been discontinued. If the indemnity has already
been paid it may be demanded back by the State.
I § 6. He who brings a claim on the basis of a decree holding the State
liable to indemnity must prosecute his claim within six months~after service of
the decree,. by application to the district attorney of the superior court within
whose circuit the proceedings in first instance took place. The highest administrative board of the State decides on the application. Its findings regularly
drawn up are to be served upon the claimant in accordance with the provisions
of the code of civil procedure.
Appeal against such decision is permissible through the legal channels. The
complaint is to be brought within three months of the service bf the administrative decision. For these actions the civil chambers of the superior courts have
exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the amount of the matter in litigation. Up
to the time the administrative decision takes effect legally the claim is not assignable.
I § 7. The indemnity is paid out of the Treasury of the State of the Empire
within whose court the criminal proceedings in first instance took place. Up to
the amount of the indemnity paid, the Treasury is subrogated to the rights which
the indemnified person had against third persons, because by their- illegal acts
they led to his detention.
§ 8. I.f. a new trial decides against the acquitted person, or the complaint
against a person against whom prosecution has been discontinued is again taken
up, the decision of the administrative authorities, as well as the payment of indemnity may be suspended.
§ 9. In matters within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in first instance -the Imperial Treasury is substituted for the State Treasury.
In this case in place of the public prosecutor of the superior court, the public prosecutor of the Supreme Court- is substituted, and in place of the highest
state administrative authorities the Imperial Chancellor is substituted.
§ 10. This law applies equally to persons acquitted in proceedings in military courts. * * *
§ 11.. [It applies also to the consular courts].
§ 12. The provisions of this law are applied to the nationals of a foreign
state only to the extent that by the legislation of their state or by treaty duly
published in the Reichsgesetzblatt reciprocity is accorded.

